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Abstract
We study the strength of set-theoretic axioms needed to prove Rabin’s
theorem on the decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite binary tree.
We first show that the complementation theorem for tree automata, which
forms the technical core of typical proofs of Rabin’s theorem, is equivalent
over the moderately strong second-order arithmetic theory ACA0 to a
determinacy principle implied by the positional determinacy of all parity
games and implying the determinacy of all Gale-Stewart games given by
boolean combinations of Σ02 sets. It follows that complementation for tree
automata is provable from Π13- but not ∆
1
3-comprehension.
We then use results due to MedSalem-Tanaka, Mo¨llerfeld and Heinatsch-
Mo¨llerfeld to prove that over Π12-comprehension, the complementation
theorem for tree automata, decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite
binary tree, positional determinacy of parity games and determinacy of
Bool(Σ02) Gale-Stewart games are all equivalent. Moreover, these state-
ments are equivalent to the Π13-reflection principle for Π
1
2-comprehension.
It follows in particular that Rabin’s decidability theorem is not provable
in ∆13-comprehension.
1 Introduction
Rabin’s decidability theorem [16] says that the monadic second order (MSO)
theory of the infinite binary tree {0, 1}∗ with the left and right successor rela-
tions is decidable. In the words of the book “The Classical Decision Problem”
[2], Rabin’s result is “one of the most important decidability theorems for math-
ematical theories and has numerous applications in several areas of mathematics
and computer science” (for a discussion, see e.g. [2, Chapter 7]).
Unlike other prominent decidability results, such as the ones for Presburger
arithmetic, real-closed fields or even the MSO theory of (N,≤), Rabin’s theo-
rem appears likely to involve significant logical strength, in the sense of being
unprovable without axioms asserting the existence of very abstract and com-
plicated sets. This is exemplified by the fact that typical modern proofs of
Rabin’s theorem, dating back to [5], invoke the determinacy of certain infinite
∗Partially supported by Polish National Science Centre grant no. 2013/09/B/ST1/04390.
†Partially supported by Polish National Science Centre grant no. 2014/13/B/ST6/03595
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games with Borel winning conditions, and determinacy principles are notorious
for requiring very large logical strength.
The framework of reverse mathematics (see [19]) offers a natural way of
measuring the logical strength of a theorem. The idea is that many mathe-
matical theorems can be formalized in the language of second-order arithmetic,
a foundational axiomatic theory used already by Hilbert and Bernays. The
most important axiom of second-order arithmetic is the comprehension scheme,
stating the existence of any set of natural numbers defined by first- and second-
order quantification over N. Reverse mathematics proceeds by analyzing various
mathematical statements and proving their equivalence, over a suitable weak
base theory, to some rather limited form of comprehension. Most mathematical
theorems analyzed in this fashion have turned out to require no more than the
theory ACA0 allowing only arithmetical comprehension, that is, the existence of
sets defined without any second-order quantifiers. Theorems requiring strictly
more than Π11-comprehension, or the existence of sets defined in terms of one
second-order quantifier, are quite exceptional. Such exceptions include the cel-
ebrated graph minor theorem [4], and a theorem in general topology proved
equivalent to Π12-comprehension in [12].
Determinacy theorems are a more extreme exception. Π11-comprehension is
barely enough to prove the determinacy of games in which the winning condition
is the intersection of an open set and a closed set. Π12-comprehension proves
that Fσ games are determined [20], but can no longer do so for games given
by arbitrary boolean combinations of Fσ sets (essentially
1 [9]). For arbitrary
boolean combinations of Fσδ sets, proving determinacy requires going beyond
second-order arithmetic, an immensely strong theory in most other respects [11].
The aim of this paper is to analyze, reverse mathematics–style, the logical
strength of Rabin’s theorem. We first focus our attention on the complemen-
tation theorem for automata on infinite trees, which is the key ingredient in
typical proofs of Rabin’s theorem and is often simply considered an alternative
formulation of the decidability result. We prove that the complementation the-
orem is equivalent over ACA0 to a determinacy principle intermediate between
the determinacy of games given by arbitrary boolean combinations of Fσ sets
and the slightly stronger statement that all parity games [3] are positionally
determined2. Using earlier work on determinacy of Gale-Stewart games, we
conclude that the complementation theorem is provable in Π13- but not Π
1
2- or
even ∆13-comprehension.
We then consider Rabin’s decidability result itself. Using the work of [9], we
prove that over Π12-comprehension, already the statement “the Π
1
3 fragment of
the MSO theory of {0, 1}∗ is decidable” implies determinacy of arbitrary boolean
combinations of Fσ sets, which makes it unprovable in ∆
1
3-comprehension. On
the other hand, any version of the decidability theorem that can be stated in
second-order arithmetic follows from the positional determinacy of parity games,
and thus also from Π13-comprehension.
The final part of our work relies on techniques developed in Michael Mo¨ller-
feld’s PhD thesis [10], which links Π12-comprehension with an arithmetical ver-
sion of the µ-calculus. Using a slight strengthening of Mo¨llerfeld’s results, we
1The original reasoning presented in [9] applies to ∆0
3
sets, but it is easily adaptable to
the case of boolean combinations of Fσ sets. We present this argument in Section 4.
2The idea of considering the parity acceptance condition for automata in order to prove
Rabin’s decidability theorem was first proposed in [3].
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show that over Π12-comprehension, the complementation theorem for automata,
Rabin’s decidability theorem, and all the main determinacy principles studied
in the paper are actually equivalent. Moreover, all these statements are equiv-
alent to a purely logical reflection principle: “all Π13 sentences provable using
Π12-comprehension are true” (note that the unprovablity of this priciple in Π
1
2-
comprehension follows from Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem).
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the necessary back-
ground in reverse mathematics, automata theory and games. In Section 3, we
characterize the logical strength of the complementation theorem for tree au-
tomata in terms of a determinacy principle. We review some earlier results on
determinacy principles in Section 4, and then use them to analyze the strength of
Rabin’s decidability theorem in Section 5. Our final result linking complemen-
tation for automata, decidability of MSO and various determinacy statements
with a reflection principle for Π12-comprehension is discussed in Section 6.
2 Basic notions
2.1 Second-order arithmetic
Second-order arithmetic is a natural framework for studying the strength of
axioms needed to prove theorems of countable mathematics, that is, the part
of mathematics concerned with objects that can be represented using no more
than countably many bits of information. The two-sorted language of second-
order arithmetic, L2, contains first-order variables x, y, z, . . ., intended to range
over natural numbers, and second-order variables X,Y, Z, . . ., intended to range
over sets of natural numbers. L2 includes the usual arithmetic functions and
relations +, ·,≤, 0, 1 on the first-order sort, and the ∈ relation which has one
first-order and one second-order argument.
Full second-order arithmetic, Z2, has axioms of three types: (i) axioms stat-
ing that the first-order sort is the non-negative part of a discretely ordered ring;
(ii) comprehension axioms, or sentences of the form
∀Y¯ ∀y¯ ∃X ∀x (x ∈ X ⇔ ϕ(x, Y¯ , y¯)),
where ϕ is an arbitrary formula of L2 not containing the variable X ; (iii) the
induction axiom,
∀X [0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x (x ∈ X ⇒ x+ 1 ∈ X)⇒ ∀x (x ∈ X)] .
The language L2 is surprisingly expressive, as the first-order sort can be
used to encode arbitrary finite objects and the second-order sort can encode
even such objects as complete separable metric spaces, continuous functions
between them, and Borel sets within them (cf. [19, Chapters II.5, II.6, V.3]).
Moreover, the theory Z2 is very strong: almost all theorems from a typical
undergraduate course that are expressible in L2 can be proved in Z2. In fact,
the basic observation underlying the programme of reverse mathematics [19] is
that many important theorems are equivalent to various fragments of Z2, where
the equivalence is proved in some specific weaker fragment, referred to as the
base theory.
For relatively strong theorems such as the ones studied in this paper, a
reasonable base theory is ACA0, the fragment of Z2 obtained by restricting the
3
comprehension scheme to instances where the formula ϕ is arithmetical, that
is, does not contain second-order quantifiers (second-order free variables are
allowed). Stronger fragments can be obtained by allowing comprehension for ϕ
with a fixed number of second-order quantifiers. A formula is Π1n if it has the
form
∀X1 ∃X2 . . .QXn ψ
with ψ arithmetical; it is Σ1n if it is the negation of a Π
1
n formula; it is ∆
1
n if it
is equivalent to both a Π1n and a Σ
1
n formula. The theory Π
1
n-CA0 is obtained
by restricting the comprehension scheme to instances where ϕ is Π1n. In the
subtheory ∆1n-CA0 of Π
1
n-CA0, the comprehension scheme takes the form
∀Y¯ ∀y¯
[
∀x (ϕ(x, Y¯ , y¯)⇔ ¬ψ(x, Y¯ , y¯))⇒ ∃X ∀x (x ∈ X ⇔ ϕ(x, Y¯ , y¯))
]
,
where both ϕ and ψ are Π1n.
The induction scheme Σ1n-IND consists of the sentences
∀Y¯ ∀y¯
[
ϕ(0, Y¯ , y¯) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x, Y¯ , y¯)⇒ ϕ(x+ 1, Y¯ , y¯))⇒ ∀xϕ(x, Y¯ , y¯)
]
where ϕ is Π1n or Σ
1
n. By the induction and comprehension axioms, Π
1
n-CA0
proves Σ1n-IND. On the other hand, Π
1
n-CA0 does not prove Σ
1
n+1-IND, while⋃
n∈ω Σ
1
n-IND does not prove Π
1
n-CA0 even assuming Π
1
n−1-CA0 (cf. [19]).
In this paper, the most prominent theory is Π12-CA0. We present some
important principles provable in Π12-CA0. The first two principles are related to
countable sequences of sets. Such a sequence 〈Xi〉i∈N can be represented by a
single set X if we let
x ∈ Xi ⇔ 〈i, x〉 ∈ X,
where 〈·, ·〉 is some standard pairing function. We write X ∈ 〈Xi〉i∈N if there is
some i such that X = Xi.
Definition 2.1. The Σ12 axiom of choice, Σ
1
2-AC, is the axiom scheme consisting
of sentences of the form
∀Z¯ ∀z¯ [∀x∃Y ϕ(x, Y, Z¯, z¯)⇒ ∃〈Yx〉x∈N ∀xϕ(x, Yx, Z¯, z¯)],
where ϕ is Σ12.
Theorem 2.2. (see [19, Theorem VII.6.9]) Π12-CA0 ⊢ Σ
1
2-AC.
A sequence 〈Xi〉i∈N can be regarded as a countable model for the language
L2, with N as the first-order universe and {Xi}i∈N as the second-order universe.
Such a model is called a countable coded model and typically denoted M .
Definition 2.3. A countable coded model M is a β2-model if for all x¯ ∈ N, X¯ ∈
M, and each Π12 formula ϕ(x¯, X¯),
M |= ϕ(x¯, X¯) iff ϕ(x¯, X¯) is true.
(A completely formal version of this definition involves truth definitions for Π12
sentences and can be found for instance in [19, Definition VII.7.2]). Note that
any true Π13 sentence remains true in each β2 model.
Theorem 2.4. (see [19, Theorem VII.6.9 and VII.7.4]) Π12-CA0 proves:
∀X ∃M (M is a β2-model and X ∈M).
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The final principle we have to discuss concerns fixpoints of iterations of
certain monotone operators. A ∆12 monotone operator is given by a pair of Π
1
2
formulas ϕ(x,X), ψ(x,X) (possibly with parameters) such that
∀x∀X (ϕ(x,X)⇔ ¬ψ(x,X))
and
∀X1 ∀X2 ∀x (X1 ⊆ X2 ∧ ϕ(x,X1))⇒ ϕ(x,X2).
We think of ϕ and ψ as defining an operator Γϕ,ψ on sets that maps a set X to
{x ∈ N : ϕ(x,X)}.
Definition 2.5. The axiom scheme ∆12-MI asserts the following for every ∆
1
2
monotone operator given by formulas ϕ, ψ: there exists a prewellordering (re-
flexive transitive relation connected on its field) 4 with field P such that
∀x [x ∈ P ⇔ x ∈ Γϕ,ψ({y : y ≺ x})] and Γϕ,ψ(P ) ⊆ P.
If 4, P are as in Definition 2.5, then P can be regarded as the inductively
generated least fixed point of Γϕ,ψ.
Theorem 2.6. [9, Theorem 5.1] Π12-CA0 ⊢ ∆
1
2-MI.
Notational convention. As above, we will use the letter N to denote the
natural numbers as formalized in second-order arithmetic, that is, the domain
of the first-order sort. On the other hand, the symbol ω will stand for the
concrete, or standard, natural numbers. For instance, given a theory T and a
formula ϕ(x), “T proves ϕ(n) for all n ∈ ω” will mean “T ⊢ ϕ(0),T ⊢ ϕ(1), . . .”,
which does not have to imply T ⊢ ∀x∈Nϕ(x)”.
The letter n will be used exclusively to denote elements of ω. As formal
variables of the first-order sort, we will typically use x, y, z, . . ., but sometimes
also i, j, k, ℓ or other lowercase letters different from n.
2.2 Automata and MSO
The study of monadic second order logic on the infinite binary tree relies heavily
on the theory of automata on infinite words and infinite trees. Our presentation
of automata theory and MSO is based on [21].
Given a finite set Σ (the so-called alphabet), a word over alphabet Σ is simply
a mapping f : N → Σ. A tree (or more precisely, labelled binary tree) over Σ is
a mapping T : {0, 1}∗ → Σ, where {0, 1}∗ stands for the set of all finite binary
strings3. Note that words and trees over Σ have another natural representation
as structures with universe N resp. {0, 1}∗ and card(Σ) disjoint unary relations
whose union is the universe.
Definition 2.7 (Nondeterministic Parity Word Automaton). A nondeterminis-
tic parity word automaton over a finite alphabet Σ is a tuple A=〈Σ, Q, qI ,∆, rk〉
where Q is a finite set of states, qI ∈Q is the initial state, ∆ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is
the transition relation, and rk : Q→ ω is the rank function.
3In automata theory, a more typical choice of symbols would be w and t instead of, respec-
tively, f and T . However, in this paper we decided to use capital letters to emphasize that
these are objects of the second-order sort.
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We use the letter δ to denote individual transitions of A, i.e. elements of ∆.
A run of a nondeterministic parity word automaton A on a word f over Σ
is a labelling ρ : N → ∆ which is consistent, that is for every position i ∈ N in
f , if ρ(i) = (qi, ai, qi+1), then
1. f(i) = ai,
2. ρ(i+ 1) = (qi+1, ai+1, qi+2),
and q0 = q
I , that is the first state in the run is the initial state of the automaton.
Intuitively, the transitions in a run have to be such that after moving from a
position i to the successor position i+ 1, the run continues from the state qi+1
indicated by the transition ρ(i).
A run ρ on a word f is accepting if the states q0, q1, . . . along this run satisfy
the parity acceptance condition:
lim inf
i∈N
rk(qi) is even.
A word f is accepted by the automaton A if there exists an accepting run of
A on f .
Definition 2.8 (Nondeterministic Parity Tree Automaton). A nondeterministic
parity tree automaton over a finite alphabet Σ is a tuple A= 〈Σ, Q, qI ,∆, rk〉
where Q is a finite set of states, qI ∈Q is the initial state, ∆ ⊆ Q×Σ×Q×Q
is the transition relation, and rk: Q→ N is the rank function.
If a transition ∆ ∋ δ has the form (q, a, q0, q1), we may write q0 = δ(a, q, 0)
and q1 = δ(a, q, 1). The idea is that if the automaton is in some vertex of the
tree and reads the letter a while in state q, it may use δ to move simultaneously
to the left son of the vertex in state q0 and to the right son in state q1.
A run of a nondeterministic parity tree automaton A on a tree T over Σ is a
labelling ρ : {0, 1}∗ → ∆ which is consistent, that is for every vertex v ∈ {0, 1}∗
if ρ(v) = (qv, av, qv0, qv1), then
1. t(v) = av,
2. ρ(vi) = (qvi, avi, qvi0, qvi1) for i = 0, 1,
and qǫ = q
I where ǫ denotes the empty string. Intuitively, the transitions in a
run have to be chosen so that after moving from a vertex v in the tree to its
sons v0, v1, the run continues from the states qv0, qv1 indicated by the transition
ρ(v).
A run ρ on a tree T is accepting if for every branch π ∈ {0, 1}N, the states
along this branch, qπ↾0 , qπ↾1 , . . . satisfy the parity acceptance condition:
lim inf
i∈N
rk(qπ↾i) is even.
A tree T is accepted by the automaton A if there exists an accepting run of
A on T .
Definition 2.9 (Deterministic automaton). We call a nondeterministic parity
word automaton A = 〈Σ, Q, qI ,∆, rk〉 a deterministic word automaton if the
transition relation ∆ is a graph of a function Q × Σ→ Q. Similarly, we call a
nondeterministic parity tree automaton A=〈Σ, Q, qI ,∆, rk〉 a deterministic tree
automaton if the transition relation δ is a graph of a function Q×Σ→ Q×Q.
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Note that a deterministic word (resp. tree) automaton has exactly one run
on each word (resp. tree).
We consider monadic second order logic MSO over the structure ({0, 1}∗, S0, S1),
where S0 and S1 are the left and right two successor relations, respectively
(S0(v, w) holds iff w = v0 and S1(v, w) holds iff w = v1). The language of MSO
over ({0, 1}∗, S0, S1) contains first-order variables x, y, . . . ranging over elements
of {0, 1}∗ and second-order variables X,Y, . . . ranging over subsets of {0, 1}∗.
Atomic formulas have the form x = y, S0(x, y), S1(x, y) and x ∈ X . The lan-
guage of MSO has the usual boolean connectives and the quantifiers ∃x, ∃X .
In the language with just the two successors, as opposed to the arithmetical
language with + and ·, there is no way to define a pairing function in MSO, so
the restriction to unary second-order quantifiers is very important.
2.3 Games
We will be concerned with games in which winning conditions take the form
of boolean combinations of Σ02 properties. To talk about arbitrary boolean
combinations of Σ02 statements, we formalize a version of the so-called difference
hierarchy over Σ02.
Let f be a distinguished second-order variable which is assumed to represent
(the graph of) a function from N to N. A (Σ02)x formula ϕ(f) is given by a
number x and a Π02 formula ψ(y, f), possibly with other parameters, such that
for all f , ψ(x, f) always holds, and for all z < y < x, if ψ(z, f), then ψ(y, f).
We say that ϕ(f) holds if
ψ(0, f) ∨ ψ(2, f) ∨ . . . ∨ ψ(2⌊x/2⌋, f);
or formally, if the smallest y ≤ x such that y = x ∨ ψ(y, f) is even.
Note that in ACA0 a (Σ
0
2)1 formula is the same thing as a Π
0
2 formula, in the
sense that for every (Σ02)1 formula ϕ(f) there is a Π
0
2 formula ξ(f) such that
ACA0 ⊢ ∀f (ϕ(f) ⇔ ξ(f)), and vice versa. Similarly, a (Σ02)x+1 formula is the
same thing as the disjunction of a Π02 formula and a negated (Σ
0
2)x formula. So,
our class (Σ02)x is dual to the usual x-th level of the difference hierarchy over
Σ02. It is a matter of routine if tedious verification that every concrete boolean
combination of Σ02 properties can be expressed by a (Σ
0
2)n formula for some
n ∈ ω.
A (Σ0
2
)x Gale-Stewart game (briefly, a (Σ
0
2
)x game) is given by a (Σ
0
2)x
formula ϕ(f), again, possibly with other parameters (in accordance with the
conventions from descriptive set theory, the boldface font serves precisely to
indicate the possible presence of parameters). The game is played by two play-
ers, 0 and 1, who alternately choose natural numbers f(0), f(1), . . ., building an
infinite sequence f ∈ NN. Player 0 wins the game if ϕ(f) holds, and player 1
wins otherwise. The notions of a strategy and winning strategy for each player
are defined as usual. The game given by ϕ(f) is determined if one of the players
has a winning strategy. For precise definitions, see e.g. [7].
Definition 2.10. (Σ0
2
)x-Det is the Π
1
3 sentence “all (Σ
0
2
)x games are deter-
mined”.
(Σ0
2
)x-Det
∗ is the same statement restricted to games in the Cantor space
{0, 1}N instead of the Baire space NN, that is to games where the players are
required to choose only numbers from {0, 1} in each move.
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Obviously, (Σ0
2
)x-Det implies (Σ
0
2
)x-Det
∗. On the other hand, it easily
follows from [13, Lemma 4.2] that, provably in ACA0, (Σ
0
2
)x+1-Det
∗ implies
(Σ0
2
)x-Det. So, we have:
Proposition 2.11. ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det] and ∀x[(Σ02)x-Det
∗] are equivalent in ACA0.
A parity game of index (0, x) is a tuple G = 〈V∃, V∀, vI , E, rk〉, where: V∃
and V∀ are disjoint sets with union V := V∃∪V∀; vI is an element of V ; E ⊆ V 2
is such that for every v ∈ V there is some w with (v, w) ∈ E; and the rank
function rk is a function from V to {0, . . . , x}. The game is played on the arena
V by the two players ∃ and ∀. The game starts in the initial position vI ; and if
it reaches position v ∈ Vp, p ∈ {∃, ∀}, then player p moves to some w such that
(v, w) ∈ E. Formally, a play of G is a sequence 〈vi〉i∈N such that v0 = vI and
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i. Player ∃ wins the play exactly if
lim inf
i∈N
rk(vi) is even.
(Σ0
2
)x-Det implies that all parity games of index (0, x) are determined. How-
ever, we also need a stronger notion of determinacy. A positional strategy (also
known as a memoryless, or forgetful, strategy) for ∃ (resp. ∀) is a function σ
from V∃ (resp. V∀) into V such that for all v in the domain, (v, σ(v)) ∈ E. A
positional strategy σ is winning if the player using σ wins every play consis-
tent with σ. The game G is positionally determined if one of the two players
has a positional winning strategy. Basic notions related to parity games come
originally from [3].
Definition 2.12 (Tree-like parity games). A parity game G is tree-like if V =
{0, 1}<N, V∃ =
⋃
i∈N N
2i, and (v, w) ∈ E iff w = v0 or w = v1.
Our notion of (Σ02)x formula was chosen to make the proof of the following
lemma rather straightforward.
Lemma 2.13. ACA0 proves that for every x, (Σ
0
2
)x-Det
∗ holds if and only if
all tree-like parity games of index (0, x) are positionally determined.
Proof. Clearly, a tree-like parity game is determined iff it is positionally deter-
mined. Moreover, such a game of index (0, x) can be thought of as a (Σ0
2
)x
Gale-Stewart game in the Cantor space given by x and the formula
ψ(y, f) := ∃z≤y ∀i ∃j>i (rk(f↾j) = z).
Note that ψ is Π02 in ACA0. This proves the left-to-right direction.
In the other direction, consider a (Σ0
2
)x Gale-Stewart game given by the Π
0
2
formula ψ(y, f). By a normal form result for Π02 analogous to the normal form
for Σ01 presented as [19, Theorem II.2.7], we may assume that ψ(y, f) has the
shape ∀z ∃u δ(y, z, u, f↾u) with all quantifiers in δ bounded by u. Define the
tree-like parity game of index (0, x) by letting rk(f↾i) equal the smallest such
y < x that for some j,
∀z<j ∃u≤ i δ(y, z, u, f↾u)
holds, but the number of k < i with rk(f↾i) = y is strictly smaller than j. If
there is no such y, let rk(f↾i) equal x. It is easy to verify in ACA0 that for every
f ∈ {0, 1}N, lim infi rk(f↾i) is exactly the smallest y such that y = x ∨ ψ(y, f).
Thus, determinacy of the parity game implies determinacy of the game given
by x and ψ.
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3 Complementation
In this section, we study the logical strength of the complementation theorem
for tree automata. We prove that the theorem is equivalent to a determinacy
principle intermediate between ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det] and the positional determinacy
of all parity games. The somewhat technical definition of the class of games ap-
pearing in the principle is abstracted from the so-called Automaton-Pathfinder
games appearing quite naturally in the proofs of Rabin’s theorem (see e.g. [21]).
The proof of our characterization works in ACA0 and, unlike the proofs in
later sections of this paper, does not rely on any earlier results related to the
logical strength of determinacy principles.
Definition 3.1. A parity game G is almost tree-like if V = {0, 1}∗×{0, . . . , k}
for some k ∈ N, V∃ =
⋃
i∈N N
2i × {0, . . . , k}, and ((v, i), (w, j)) ∈ E implies
(w = v0 ∨ w = v1).
Theorem 3.2. The following are equivalent over ACA0:
(1) all almost tree-like parity games are positionally determined,
(2) for every tree automaton A there exists a tree automaton B such that for
any tree T , B accepts T iff A does not accept T .
From Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 2.13 we immediately get:
Corollary 3.3. ACA0 proves the implications (1)⇒ (2) and (2)⇒ (3) for:
(1) all parity games are positionally determined,
(2) for every tree automaton A there exists a tree automaton B such that for
any tree T , B accepts T iff A does not accept T ,
(3) ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det], or equivalently, all tree-like parity games are positionally
determined.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. (1) ⇒ (2). We formalize a standard proof of the com-
plementation theorem for tree automata, similar e.g. to the one in [21]. Let
A = {ΣA, QA, qIA,∆A, rkA} be a parity tree automaton. We may assume
w.l.o.g. that for each a ∈ ΣA, q ∈ QA, there is at least one transition in ∆A of
the form (q, a, ·, ·). This is because A can be easily modified so as to satisfy this
condition without changing the class of accepted trees.
Given a labelled binary tree T , consider the following game GA,T between
two players, Automaton and Pathfinder. The set of Automaton’s positions is
{0, 1}∗×QA, with (∅, qIA) the starting position, while the set of Pathfinder’s posi-
tions is {0, 1}∗×∆A. Given a position (w, q), Automaton can choose a transition
from q, that is, move to the position (w, δ), where ∆A ∋ δ = (q, T (w), q0, q1).
Pathfinder responds by deciding which direction to take from w, that is, by
moving either to position (w0, q0) or to (w1, q1). A play of the game induces a
sequence of states 〈qi〉i∈N ∈ (QA)N, and Automaton wins if and only if
lim inf
i∈N
rkA(qi) is even.
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Note that because of the assumption that A has at least one transition from
every letter and state, GA,T can easily be formalized as an almost tree-like
parity game.
GA,T is defined in such a way that A accepts T if and only if Automaton
has a positional winning strategy. Thus, by positional determinacy, A does not
accept T if and only if Pathfinder has a positional winning strategy in GA,T .
Let S be the (finite) set of all maps from ∆A into {0, 1}. Note that a
positional strategy for Pathfinder can be represented as a labelled binary tree
S such that S(w) ∈ S for all w ∈ {0, 1}∗. The strategy is winning if for any
choice of transitions 〈δw〉w∈{0,1}∗ consistent with the labelling of T , the ranks
of states of A appearing on the path determined by S and 〈δw〉w∈{0,1}∗ do not
satisfy the parity condition.
We will construct an automaton B which accepts a tree T if and only
Pathfinder has a positional winning strategy in GA,T . The construction of B
proceeds in four standard steps, of which three are elementary and one invokes
McNaughton’s determinization theorem for word automata ([8]), discussed sep-
arately below.
In the first step of the construction we build a deterministic word automaton
A1 which accepts all infinite words 〈(si, ai, δi, πi)〉i∈N ∈ (S×ΣA×∆A×{0, 1})
N
such that if
∀i∈N (si(δi) = πi) (⋆)
and if we define
q0 = q
I
A
qi+1 = δi(ai, qi, πi),
then either at some point qi+1 cannot be defined (i.e. δi is not a transition from
state qi and letter ai) or
lim inf
i∈N
rkA(qi) is odd.
The set of states of A1 is QA ∪ {⊤}, where rkA1(q) = rkA(q) + 1 for q ∈ QA1
and ⊤ is an additional accepting state (i.e. with rank 0). The transitions are
defined in the natural way, except that whenever the rule (⋆) is violated or qi+1
cannot be defined, we redirect the computation to state ⊤.
In the second step we consider the following property of infinite words
〈(si, ai, πi)〉i∈N ∈ (S × ΣA × {0, 1})N: for every sequence 〈δi〉i∈N ∈ (∆A)N,
the word 〈(si, ai, δi, πi)〉i∈N is accepted by A1. Note that thanks to the fact
that A1 is deterministic, the complement of this property is recognized by a
nondeterministic word automaton. By determinization of word automata ([8],
see below) we can find a deterministic parity word automaton A2 recognizing
this property.
In the third step we define a tree automaton A3 over the alphabet S × A
such that a tree (S, T ) is accepted if for every infinite path π ∈ {0, 1}N, if
〈(si, ai)〉i∈N is the sequence of labels appearing on this path, then the infinite
word 〈(si, ai, πi)〉i∈N is accepted by the automaton A2. So, A3 accepts (S, T ) iff
S encodes a positional winning strategy for Pathfinder in GA,T . The states of
A3 are the same as those of A2, and defining the transition function is unprob-
lematic thanks to the fact that A2 is deterministic.
10
Finally, in the fourth step we define the nondeterministic tree automaton B
as accepting a given tree T over ΣA if there exists a labelling S : {0, 1}∗ → S
such that the tree (S, T ) is accepted by A3. During its computation on T , B uses
nondeterminism to “guess” the labels S(w) for w ∈ {0, 1}∗. By construction B
accepts T iff Pathfinder has a positional winning strategy in GA,T .
Determinization of word automata. To complete the proof of (1)⇒ (2), we
need to make sure that ACA0 + (1) is able to prove that McNaughton’s result
[8] that every nondeterministic word automaton is equivalent to a deterministic
automaton. In fact, this is provable in ACA0 and does not require the full power
of ACA0.
The determinization of a nondeterministic word automaton with a parity
condition proceeds in two steps. The first is to replace the original automaton
by a nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton (i.e. with index (0, 1)). This is straight-
forward: assume that the original automaton, say A, has index (0, x), so that A
accepts a word if it has a computation in which the lim inf of ranks of states is
some odd number y ≤ x. The Bu¨chi automaton B behaves like A, except that
it additionally uses nondeterminism to do two things. Firstly, in the very first
transition it guesses the value of y. Secondly, at some point in the computation
it guesses that states with rank > y will no longer appear; from that point
onwards, it assigns rank 0 to states with rank y in A, rank 1 to states with rank
< y in A, and aborts the computation if A wants to enter a state with rank
> y.
It remains is to build a deterministic parity word automation simulating a
nondeterministic Bu¨chi word automaton B. This can be carried out by means of
the Safra construction, originally due to [17]. This is a sophisticated refinement
of the classical power set construction used for finite word automata (on finite
words, a nondeterministic automaton with set of states Q can be simulated by
a deterministic automation with set of states P(Q)). In the Safra construction,
the states of the new deterministic automaton D are certain (bounded-size)
trees with vertices labelled by letters from a certain fixed finite alphabet. The
combinatorial details of the construction are a little involved, but the logical
strength engaged is quite modest. The construction of D from B is completely
elementary, the proof that acceptance of B implies acceptance of D requires
nothing beyond defining number sequences by recursion with an arithmetical
condition in the recursion step, and the other direction additionally makes use
of Ko¨nig’s Lemma in the form known as weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma, WKL; all this
is well-known to be readily formalizable in ACA0. (For details of the Safra
construction, see e.g. [14, 21]4.)
Remark. We have not attempted a careful verification, but we believe that
the proof of determinization for word automata goes through in the fragment of
ACA0 known asWKL0 extended by the induction scheme for Σ
0
2 formulas. With-
out Σ02 induction, the basic notions of automata theory on infinite structures
make little sense, in particular the lim inf of ranks appearing in a computation
might not exist.
(2) ⇒ (1). For any fixed x, k ∈ N, we can represent almost tree-like parity
games with index (0, x) and arena {0, 1}∗ × {0, . . . , k} by labelled binary trees
4The proof presented in [21] yields a deterministic automaton with the so-called Rabin
acceptance condition, which can be simulated without difficulty by a parity condition; the
modified construction of [14] leads directly to a deterministic parity automaton.
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over a suitable alphabet Σx,k. The label of a node v in such a tree lists the
ranks of all positions (v, i) and lists all pairs ((v, i), (v0, j)) and ((v, i), (v1, j))
in E. Thus, Σx,k should contain (x + 1)
k+1 · 22(k+1)
2
symbols.
Assume ¬(1) and let x ∈ N be such that there is an undetermined almost
tree-like parity game with index (0, x), set of positions {0, 1}∗ × {0, . . . , k} and
edge relation E such that ((v, i), (w, j)) ∈ E implies w = vb for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
A tree over Σx,k representing a gameG has the propertyW
∃
0,x,k (resp.W
∀
0,x,k)
if ∃ (resp. ∀) has a positional winning strategy in G. Note that both W ∃0,x,k
andW ∀0,x,k can be expressed by MSO sentences with 4 blocks of quantifiers. For
instance, the sentence expressing W ∃0,x,k is the prenex normal form of
∃S1 . . . ∃Sℓ ∀P1 . . . ∀Pr

α(S¯, P¯ ) ∨ ∨
0≤y≤⌊x/2⌋
β2y(S¯, P¯ )

 ,
where the S’s represent a positional strategy for player ∃, the P ’s represent
potential plays of the game, α is a purely existential first-order formula stating
that the play P¯ is inconsistent with the strategy S¯, and each β2y is an ∀∃ ∨ ∃∀
first-order formula stating that 2y is the lim inf of ranks appearing in the play
P¯ . The sentence expressing W ∀0,x,k is defined analogously.
Now assume (2). It is routine to verify in ACA0 that any quantifier-free
expressible property of labelled trees is recognized by a nondeterministic tree
automaton. The usual argument by induction on formula complexity (see e.g.
[21, Theorem 6.7, cf. Theorem 3.1]), using (2) in the step for ¬ and the nonde-
terminism of automata in the step for a block of second-order ∃’s, proves that
every property of labelled trees expressible by an MSO sentence with at most 5
quantifier blocks can be recognized by a tree automaton. Hence, for any fixed
x, k there is an automaton Ax,k recognizing ¬W ∃0,x,k ∧ ¬W
∀
0,x,k. It remains to
show that this implies (1).
A labelled tree T is regular if there is some bound d ∈ N with the follow-
ing property: for every vertex v ∈ {0, 1}∗ there exists w ∈ {0, 1}<d such that
the subtree of T under w is the same as the subtree under v, that is, for all
u ∈ {0, 1}∗, T (vu) = T (wu). We complete the argument by proving two lem-
mas about regular trees which together immediately imply that Ax,k cannot
accept any tree, and therefore (1) holds. The first lemma expresses a com-
pletely standard fact, whereas the second is interesting only in a context where
positional determinacy of parity games is not known in advance.
Lemma 3.4. ACA0 proves that any tree automaton which accepts some tree
also accepts a regular tree.
Proof. Let A be a tree automaton of index (0, x). Consider the following parity
game GA. The game arena is split into V∃ = QA and V∀ = ∆A with q
I
A as the
initial position. When the game is in position q ∈ QA, player ∃ moves to some
δ ∈ ∆A of the form (q, a, q′, q′′) for some a ∈ ΣA, q′, q′′ ∈ QA. Now the game is
in position δ, and player ∀ decides whether to go left or right, that is, moves to
either q′ or q′′. Player ∃ wins if lim inf of ranks of states visited during the play
is even (formally this is achieved by setting the ranks of all δ ∈ ∆A to x).
The positional determinacy of parity games on finite arenas is known to be
provable even in S22 , a very weak subtheory of ACA0 [1]. Moreover, if A accepts
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some tree T , then player ∃ clearly has a winning strategy in A, and thus also
a positional winning strategy, say σ. Now construct a labelled tree Tσ in the
following way: to determine the label T (w) for w ∈ {0, 1}∗, simulate a play of
GA in which ∃ plays according to σ, ∀ chooses directions so as to reach w, and
for each i ≤ lh(w) the label T (w↾i) is chosen to correspond to the transition δ
chosen by ∃. Tσ is accepted by A because σ is a winning strategy. Additionally,
Tσ is a regular tree because GA has a finite arena and σ is positional.
Lemma 3.5. ACA0 proves that for each x and k, the almost treelike parity game
represented by a regular tree T over Σx,k is determined.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Let T be a regular tree over Σx,k encoding an almost tree-
like parity game G. Define U to be the set consisting of those v ∈ {0, 1}∗ for
which there is no w length-lexicographically smaller than v such that the lengths
of v and w are congruent mod 2 and T (vu) = T (wu) for all u (the additional
congruence condition is needed to distinguish between moves of different play-
ers). The formula defining U is arithmetical, so U is indeed a set. Moreover,
since T is regular, the set U is finite.
Consider the following parity game H with arena V := U × {0, . . . , k}. The
assignment of positions to players and the ranks of positions are inherited from
G. A move from (v, i) to (w, j) is possible in H if and only if the subtree of
T under w is identical to the subtree under a son vb of v and the label T (v)
indicates that a move from (v, i) to (vb, j) is possible in G. The game H exists
by arithmetical comprehension. By positional determinacy of parity games on
finite arenas, H is positionally determined provably in ACA0. Let σH be a
positional winning strategy for one of the players, say ∃.
We can use σH to define a positional strategy σG in the game G represented
by T : at position (v, i), player ∃ finds the unique vertex w ∈ U such that the
lengths of w and v are congruent mod 2 and T under v is the same as T under
w, and then moves from (v, i) analogously to the move σH would make at (w, i).
The strategy σG exists by arithmetical comprehension, and since any play of G
consistent with σG corresponds to a play of H consistent with σH , σG is in fact
a winning strategy for ∃ in G.
The proofs of the Lemmas conclude the proof of Theorem 3.2.
4 Determinacy vs comprehension
We now turn our attention to the question which set-theoretic existence axioms
are needed to prove the determinacy statements considered in Theorem 3.2
and Corollary 3.3. For the statement ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det], sharp upper and lower
bounds on the requisite amount of comprehension follow from earlier work on
determinacy statements in second-order arithmetic, most importantly [10, 6, 9].
We begin with the upper bound. The following result is a direct corollary of
the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [9]:
Theorem 4.1 ([9]). ACA0 +∆
1
2-MI+Σ
1
3-IND ⊢ ∀x[(Σ
0
2
)x-Det].
By Theorem 2.6, it follows that ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det] is provable from Π
1
2-CA0 +
Σ13-IND, and hence also from Π
1
3-CA0. In fact, it is known that Π
1
3-CA0 already
suffices to formalize Davis’ proof of Σ0
3
determinacy.
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On the other hand, Π12-CA0 by itself can only prove a smaller amount of
determinacy:
Theorem 4.2 ([6], relying heavily on [10]). Over ACA0, the theory
{(Σ0
2
)n-Det : n ∈ ω}
implies all the Π11 consequences of Π
1
2-CA0.
In fact, the methods of [10] can be used to prove a strengthening of Theorem
4.2. We state the stronger version, accompanied by a proof sketch, as Theorem
6.1 below.
Theorem 4.2 and a standard argument imply the following corollary, which
is proved exactly as the formally slightly weaker Theorem 5.6 in [9]:
Corollary 4.3 (essentially in [9]). ∆13-CA0 6⊢ ∀x[(Σ
0
2
)x-Det].
Proof sketch. ∆13-CA0 is Π
1
4-conservative over Π
1
2-CA0, so it suffices to show that
∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det] is unprovable in Π
1
2-CA0.
By Theorem 2.4, Π12-CA0 proves the existence of a β2-model. Since every
true Π13 sentence remains true in a β2-model, for every Π
1
3 sentence ϕ we have:
Π12-CA0 ⊢ ϕ⇒ Con(ϕ),
where Con is a formalized consistency statement (cf. [19, Corollary VII.7.8.2]).
Now apply this to ACA0 ∧ ∀x[(Σ
0
2
)x-Det] as ϕ (ACA0 is well-known to be
axiomatizable by a single Π12 sentence). If ϕ were provable in Π
1
2-CA0, then also
Con(ϕ) would be provable. But Con(ϕ) is Π01, so by Theorem 4.2 it would follow
from ACA0 + (Σ
0
2
)n-Det for some n ∈ ω, and hence from ϕ itself. The theory
ACA0 + ∀x[(Σ02)x-Det] would then contradict Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem.
Therefore, ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det], and by Theorem 3.2 also the complementation
theorem for tree automata, is provable from Π13- but not ∆
1
3-comprehension.
On the other hand, the argument used to prove Theorem 4.2 in [9] gives:
Theorem 4.4 ([9]). ACA0 +∆
1
2-MI, and thus also Π
1
2-CA0, proves (Σ
0
2
)n-Det
for all n ∈ ω, as well as
∀x ((Σ0
2
)x-Det⇒ (Σ
0
2
)x+1-Det).
Corollary 4.5 ([9]). ACA0+∆
1
2-MI, and thus also Π
1
2-CA0, proves (Σ
0
2
)n-Det
∗
for all n ∈ ω, as well as
∀x ((Σ0
2
)x-Det
∗ ⇒ (Σ0
2
)x+1-Det
∗).
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 4.4, (Σ0
2
)x-Det ⇒ (Σ02)x-Det
∗,
and (Σ0
2
)x+1-Det
∗ ⇒ (Σ0
2
)x-Det.
We now turn to the positional determinacy of parity games. Of course, by
Proposition 2.11 and Lemma 2.13, ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det] is equivalent to a special case
of the positional determinacy of parity games, so the lower bounds on provability
of ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det] remain valid also here: the positional determinacy of all parity
games is not provable in ∆13-CA0. The lemma below shows that also the upper
bound of Π12-CA0 +Σ
1
3-IND, and a fortiori Π
1
3-CA0, remains valid.
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Lemma 4.6. For each n ∈ ω, Π12-CA0 proves that parity games of index (0, n)
are positionally determined. Moreover, Π12-CA0 proves that for every x, if parity
games of index (0, x) are positionally determined, then so are parity games of
index (0, x+ 1).
Remark. Our proof of Lemma 4.6 is again the formalization of a standard ar-
gument in the spirit of the one presented in [21]. We strongly believe that the
MedSalem-Tanaka argument showing Theorem 4.4 can be adapted to give a
proof of the step from (0, x) to (0, x + 1) in ACA0 + ∆
1
2-MI, but we have not
attempted to do it.
Proof. Since parity games of index (0, 0) are trivially positionally determined, it
is enough to prove the second part of the statement. So, assume that all parity
games of index (0, x) are positionally determined and let G = 〈V∃, V∀, vI , E, rk〉
be a game of index (0, x+1). For each v ∈ V , we will write Gv to denote a game
defined just like G but with starting position v instead of vI . Π
1
2-comprehension
guarantees the existence of the set
W∀ = {v : player ∀ has a positional winning strategy in Gv}.
Let U be V \W∀. Our aim is to prove that player ∃ has a positional winning
strategy in Gv for each v ∈ U . Of course, this will in particular imply the
positional determinacy of G. We first prove a useful claim.
Claim. Player ∀ has a single positional strategy σ∀ which is winning in each Gv
for v ∈ W∀. Moreover, each play of Gv, v ∈ W∀, consistent with σ∀ never leaves
W∀.
To see that the claim is true, note that by Theorem 2.2 we can apply Σ12-AC
to conclude that there exists a sequence of positional strategies 〈σv〉v∈W∀ such
that σv is winning for p in Gv. Π
1
1-comprehension implies the existence of a
sequence 〈Uv〉v∈W∀ such that for each v,
Uv = {w ∈ W∀ : σw is winning for ∀ in Gv}.
Observe that Uv is nonempty for each v ∈ W∀. Now define σ∀(v), v ∈ W∀ ∩ V∀,
to be σw(v) for w = min(Uv); for v /∈W∀, define σ∀(v) arbitrarily. Given a play
〈vi〉i∈N consistent with σ∀ and such that v0 ∈ W∀, we can prove by induction on i
that vi ∈ W∀ and that the sequence 〈min(Uvi)〉i∈N is nonincreasing. Thus, from
some round i onwards the play is actually consistent with some fixed strategy
σw which is winning for ∀ in Gvi . This proves the Claim.
Note that for v ∈ U ∩ V∀, all edges from v must lead to vertices in U . The
Claim also implies that for v ∈ U ∩ V∃, at least one edge from v must lead to a
vertex in U .
Let N be the set U ∩ rk−1[{0}]. Consider the following formula ϕ(x,X):
x ∈ U ∧ [x ∈ N ∨ x ∈ X
∨ (x ∈ V∃ and there exists an edge from x into X)
∨ (x ∈ V∀ and all edges from x lead into X).]
Since ϕ is ∆12 (in fact, arithmetical) and contains only positive appearances of
the variable X , Theorem 2.6 implies the existence of the inductively generated
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least fixed point P of the operation X 7→ {x ∈ N : ϕ(x,X)}, along with a
prewellordering 4 such that P is the field of 4 and x ∈ P ⇔ ϕ(x, {y : y ≺ x}).
Note that ∃ has a positional strategy π on P \N such that π guarantees reaching
a vertex in N in finitely many steps and staying inside P until that happens.
The strategy is defined by: π(v) = the smallest w such that w ≺ v (this is
well-defined on P \N unless N = ∅, in which case P = ∅ as well).
Now let R be U \ P . Note that for v ∈ R ∩ V∃, all edges from v must lead
to vertices in W∀ ∪ R, while for v ∈ R ∩ V∀, at least one edge from v must
lead to a vertex in R. So, it makes sense to consider the parity game G↾R
obtained by restricting G to the induced subgraph on R. All vertices in R have
ranks from {1, . . . , x + 1}, so by the inductive assumption each game (G↾R)v
for v ∈ R is positionally determined. It is not hard to check, using the Claim,
that a positional winning strategy for ∀ in (G↾R)v would also give a positional
winning strategy for ∀ in Gv, so in fact it is player ∃ who wins each (G↾R)v.
By an obvious analogue of our Claim for (G↾R)v, this means that ∃ has a single
positional strategy ρ which wins (G↾R)v for each v ∈ R.
Define a positional strategy σ∃ for ∃ as follows:
σ∃(v) =


π(v) v ∈ P \N,
ρ(v) v ∈ R,
arbitrary outside W∀ v ∈ N,
arbitrary v ∈W∀.
It is easy to verify that for each v ∈ U , σ∃ is winning for ∃ in Gv.
5 Decidability
Theorem 3.2, combined with the results discussed in Section 4, leads to an easy
argument showing that Π12-CA0 is not only unable to prove the complementation
theorem for tree automata, but also unable to prove the decidability of the MSO
theory of the infinite binary tree by any other method.
Theorem 5.1. ACA0 proves the implications (1) ⇒ (2n), n ∈ ω, and Π12-CA0
proves the implications (2n)⇒ (3), ω ∋ n ≥ 3, where:
(1) all parity games are positionally determined,
(2n) there is a Turing machine t which halts on every input and accepts exactly
the Π1n sentences of MSO true in ({0, 1}
∗, S0, S1),
(3) ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det].
Remark. In an “ideal version” of Theorem 5.1, the statements (2n) would be
replaced by a single statement (2): “there is a Turing machine t which halts on
every input and accepts exactly the sentences of MSO true in ({0, 1}∗, S0, S1)”.
However, by Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth, the natural way of
expressing “sentence ϕ is true in ({0, 1}∗, S0, S1)” as a property of the variable
ϕ cannot be formalized in the language of second-order arithmetic. On the
other hand, it is possible to formulate a truth definition for Π1n sentences, in
particular for Π1n sentences of MSO; as Theorem 5.1 shows, the case n = 3 is
crucial here.
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Remark. With some modifications, the technique used to prove the theorem
could also be employed to show that over Π12-CA0, each statement (2n) for
ω ∋ n ≥ 3 is exactly equivalent to the positional determinacy of almost treelike
parity games. However, in the next section we prove a more general result using
a different approach.
Proof. Both directions of the proof rely on ideas similar to those in the proof of
(2)⇒ (1) of Theorem 3.2.
(1)⇒ (2n). By Corollary 3.3, (1) implies the complementation theorem for
tree automata. Moreover, the implication goes through in ACA0.
Just like in the proof of (2)⇒ (1) of Theorem 3.2, complementation for tree
automata makes it possible to formalize the usual algorithm constructing an
automaton equivalent to an MSO formula ϕ on all labelled binary trees. Given
a fixed n ∈ ω, the correctness of this algorithm restricted to ϕ ∈ Π1n is easily
verified in ACA0.
It remains to have a procedure to deciding whether a given tree automaton
A accepts any tree at all. This is equivalent to the problem whether player ∃
wins the game GA described in the proof of Lemma 3.4, and determining the
winner of a parity game on a finite arena is a decidable problem provably well
within ACA0 [1].
(23) ⇒ (3) For each x ∈ N, there is a Π
1
3 MSO sentence ψx expressing the
positional determinacy of treelike parity games of index (0, x). Modulo minor
technicalities, ψx is “for all labellings using labels from Σx,0, either W
∃
0,x,0 or
W ∀0,x,0 holds”, where Σx,k, W
∃
0,x,k, W
∀
0,x,k are as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
By Lemma 2.13, ψx is true in {0, 1}∗ exactly if (Σ02)x-Det
∗ holds.
Let t be a Turing machine given by (2). For each x, t(ψx) = yes exactly
if (Σ0
2
)x-Det
∗ holds. Therefore, by Corollary 4.4, t(ψ0) = yes and for every x,
t(ψx) = yes implies t(ψx+1) = yes.
By arithmetical comprehension, the set X = {x : t(ψx) = yes} exists. Since
X contains 0 and is closed under successor, we conclude that X = N. Therefore
each ψx is true in {0, 1}∗ and so we have ∀x[(Σ02)x-Det].
6 Rabin’s theorem as a reflection principle
Our aim now is to prove that over Π12-CA0, Rabin’s decidability theorem, com-
plementation for tree automata, and the determinacy statements appearing in
Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 are actually all equivalent. Furthermore, all
these statements are equivalent to a logical reflection principle stating that all
Π13 sentences provable in Π
1
2-CA0 are true.
Our proofs in this section rely in an essential way on both the results and
the techniques of Mo¨llerfeld’s thesis [10]. At present we see no way of avoiding
reliance on these advanced techniques.
To achieve this, we first notice that slight changes to the argument of [10]
yield a strengthening of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 6.1. Over ACA0, the theory
{(Σ0
2
)n-Det : n ∈ ω}
axiomatizes the Π13 consequences of Π
1
2-CA0.
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Proof sketch. There is a well-known correspondence between sufficiently strong
fragments of second-order arithmetic and weak systems of set theory formulated
in the usual set-theoretic language L∈ (cf. for instance [19, Chapter VII.3]). L∈
is translated into L2 by letting the ∈-structure of sets be represented by well-
founded trees in NN. The inverse translation is the obvious one: ∃x becomes
∃x∈ωset, and ∃X becomes ∃x⊆ωset. (Here we use the symbol ωset for the usual
set-theoretic definition of the natural numbers as formalized in L∈. This should
not be confused with our use of ω in the earlier sections.)
Π12-CA0 corresponds to the set theory Lim(1), which consists of the basic
axioms known as BTr (extensionality, pair, union, ∆0-separation, and set foun-
dation) and the axiom ∀x∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y ≺1 V], where y ≺1 V means: “y is a
transitive set, and for all a¯ ∈ y and Σ1 formulas ϕ (of L∈), ϕ(a¯) iff y |= ϕ(a¯)”.
Now assume that Π12-CA0 proves the Π
1
3 sentence π. It follows that Lim(1)
implies the set-theoretic translation π∗ of π. As written, π∗ is a Π3 sentence of
L∈:
∀x⊆ωset∃y⊆ωset∀z⊆ωsetδ(x, y, z),
with δ a bounded formula of L∈. However, Lim(1) proves the so-called Ax-
iom β, which is a variant of the Mostowski collapse lemma: it states that any
transitive relation r on a set a can be homomorphically mapped onto the set
membership relation on some set b. (A statement of Axiom β, and a sketch of
a proof in a subtheory of Lim(1), can be found for instance in [15, Chapter
11.6].) Because of this, the Π11 subformula of π
∗, ∀z ⊆ ωsetδ(x, y, z), which is
equivalent to the statement that a certain relation rx,y parametrized by x, y is
well-founded, can provably in Lim(1) be rewritten in a Σ1 way: “there exists a
Mostowski collapse of rx,y”. Furthermore, the existence of a Mostowski collapse
of rx,y implies the well-foundedness of rx,y already in the weaker theory BT
r
(thanks to the set foundation axiom). What this means is that there is a Π2
sentence π˜∗ such that
Lim(≺1) ⊢ π˜∗ ⇔ π
∗
BTr ⊢ π˜∗ ⇒ π∗.
By [10, Theorem 10.4], every Π2 sentence of L∈ provable in Lim(≺1) is also
provable in a certain extension BTσr of BTr. In particular, BTσr proves π˜∗ and
therefore also π∗. However, by [10, Theorem 8.15], every L2 sentence whose
translation is provable in a theory Ref ⊇ BTσr is itself provable in an arithmetic
version of the µ-calculus, which by [6] is in turn conservative over ACA0 +
{(Σ0
2
)n-Det : n ∈ ω}.
Even though Theorem 6.1 concerns relatively strong theories, the work in
[6, 10] involved in its proof relies only on (sketches of) explicit primitive recur-
sive constructions of proofs in various formal theories and, at one point, the
cut elimination theorem for first-order logic. Therefore, we have the following
corollary of the proof.
Corollary 6.2. Primitive recursive arithmetic, and thus a fortiori Π12-CA0,
proves that the theory
ACA0 + {(Σ
0
2
)x-Det : x ∈ N}
axiomatizes the Π13 consequences of Π
1
2-CA0.
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The reflection principle RFNΠ1
3
(Π12-CA0) is the formalized statement “every
Π13 sentence provable in Π
1
2-CA0 is true”, or
∀ϕ∈Π13 [PrΠ1
2
-CA0(ϕ)⇒ Tr(ϕ)],
where Pr is a standard formalized provability predicate and Tr is a truth defi-
nition for Π13 sentences. Note that RFNΠ1
3
(Π12-CA0) implies Con(Π
1
2-CA0) and
hence is unprovable in Π12-CA0.
Theorem 6.3. The following are equivalent over Π12-CA0:
(1) all parity games are positionally determined,
(2) ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det],
(3) for every tree automaton A there exists a tree automaton B such that for
any tree T , B accepts T exactly if A does not accept T ,
(4) there is a Turing machine t which halts on every input and accepts exactly
the Π13 sentences of MSO true in ({0, 1}
<N, S0, S1),
(5) RFNΠ1
3
(Π12-CA0).
Proof. Given Theorems 3.2 and 5.1, it is enough to prove (5)⇒ (1) and (2)⇒
(5). We reason in Π12-CA0.
The implication from (5) to (1) is essentially immediate. Let ϕ(v) be a Π13
formula with free variable v stating that all parity games of index (0, x) are
positionally determined. For each x ∈ N, let ϕx be the Π13 sentence obtained by
substituting a canonical name (numeral) for x into ϕ(v). By Lemma 4.6, we have
PrΠ1
2
-CA0(ϕ0) and PrΠ12-CA0(p∀v (ϕ(v) ⇒ ϕ(v + 1))q), so also also PrΠ12-CA0(ϕx)
for each x ∈ N. By (5), we obtain Tr(ϕx) for each x, so indeed all parity games
are positonally determined.
Now assume (2) and consider a Π13 sentence ϕ of the form
∀X ∃Y ∀Z ψ(X,Y, Z),
with ψ arithmetical, such that PrΠ1
2
-CA0(ϕ0). By Corollary 6.2, there is some
x ∈ N such that ∀X ∃Y ∀Z ψ(X,Y, Z) is provable from ACA0 + (Σ02)x-Det.
Assume that ϕ is false. This means that there is some set S such that
∀Y ∃Z ¬ψ(S, Y, Z). By Theorem 2.4, there is a countable coded β2-model M
such that S ∈M . Since M is a β2-model, we have
M |= ∀Y ∃Z ¬ψ(S, Y, Z).
However, since both ACA0 and (Σ
0
2
)x-Det are true and have complexity no
higher than Π13, we also have
M |= ACA0 ∧ (Σ
0
2
)x-Det.
Now, take the proof π of ∀X ∃Y ∀Z ψ(X,Y, Z) from ACA0∧(Σ02)x-Det. Since
M is countable, we can express the statement “the y-th formula in π is true in
M” as an arithmetical formula τ(y). By induction on y, τ(y) holds for all y
smaller than the length of π. But the last formula in π is ∀X ∃Y ∀Z ψ(X,Y, Z),
so
M |= ∀X ∃Y ∀Z ψ(X,Y, Z),
a contradiction. This proves (5).
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7 Further work
Determinacy As part of Theorem 6.3, we prove the equivalence of the deter-
minacy principle ∀x[(Σ0
2
)x-Det] and positional determinacy of all parity
games. Our proof of this equivalence relies on the advanced techniques of
[10], goes through an intermediate step involving the reflection principle
RFNΠ1
3
(Π12-CA0), and requires Π
1
2-CA0 as a base theory.
Is there a simpler, more elementary proof of this equivalence with Π12-CA0
as the base theory? Is there a proof in ACA0? As a possibly easier question,
does either of the implications in Corollary 3.3 reverse over ACA0?
Bu¨chi’s theorem Bu¨chi’s Theorem states that nondeterministic word automata
are closed under complementation (this implies the decidability of the
MSO theory of (N,≤)). Because ACA0 proves that word automata can
be determinized (cf. the proof of Theorem 3.2), also Bu¨chi’s Theorem is
provable within ACA0. However, what is the exact reverse-mathematical
strength of the theorem?
Weak MSO over the binary tree Can statements related to the decidabil-
ity of the weak MSO theory of the infinite binary tree be characterized as
determinacy principles, for instance as the determinacy of Boolean com-
binations of open games?
MSO theory over the reals R In [18] it shown that the MSO theory of the
real line with the natural ordering is undecidable. However, once the
quantification is restricted to Fσ sets, the theory is decidable [16]. Is there
a proof of this decidability result not relying on the full strength of Rabin’s
theorem?
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